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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The sub-prime crisis and the breakdown of the financial sector in the USA starting 
October 2008 has seen its impact spreading to the rest of the world. So much so that many 
commentators have viewed the consequent slowdown in economic activity throughout the 
world  as  an  indicator  of  recessionary  conditions  worldwide  not  seen  since  the  Great 
Depression of the 1930s. One of the causes of this crisis has been the breakdown of the 
regulatory  framework  which  allowed  financial  institutions  to  expand  their  asset  base  to 
include what are now considered ‘toxic assets’. While the origin of these ‘toxic assets’ was 
speculative  activity  in  the  real  estate  market,  many  manufacturing  firms  are  now  being 
impacted  by  the  slowdown  in  economic  activity.  It  is  now  also  being  argued  that  the 
regulatory bodies failed to enforce accountability and good governance on the managers of 
many of these financial institutions. 
While studies of corporate governance have proliferated in recent years they have been 
mainly concerned with the issue of internal governance mechanisms like form and type of 
firm  ownership. So the question raised is  whether insider ownership promotes  or retards 
shareholder wealth. The answer to this question raises important policy issues on the nature 
of the variables that regulatory bodies should monitor. However, an important issue at the 
macro level is the impact of external governance mechanisms in moderating the impact of 
insider ownership on shareholder wealth. One such mechanism is competition in the firm’s 
product and factor market. This issue is particularly important in developing countries many 
of which have legislated competition laws in recent years and are now putting in place the 
necessary regulatory authority. 
Does product market competition discipline insiders and induce better firm performance 
in a developing economy?  The empirical evidence from the developed countries (Nickel et 
al. (1997), Griffith (2001), Januszewski et al. (1999), Koke and Renneeboog (2005)) gives an 
answer in the affirmative. Yet there is limited evidence on this issue in the case of developing 
countries  like  India  which  have  enthusiastically  embraced  a  pro  competition  regulatory 
regime. As is well known, India embarked upon the path of economic reforms after a balance 
of payment crisis in 1991. In this context, it improved its competition climate via a series of 
changes  in  both  domestic and trade policies. The government  gradually  moved out  from 
production activities and private sector is now allowed in most of the industries which were 
earlier  reserved  for  public  sector  and  small  scale  industries.  The  most  important  policy 
change after 1991 was the industrial licensing policy of 1991 which significantly improved 
the conditions of entry for both domestic and foreign firms. The pro-competition stance in 
trade policy has been equally remarkable. Apart from making the exchange rate more market 
oriented, the main thrusts of trade policy changes have been to reduce quantitative restrictions 
on imports, reduce import tariffs and end selective protection for the small-scale industries. 
These institutional changes have impacted most of the economic activities and (see Pant and 
Pattanayak, 2005; Panagariya, 2005) and set the stage for competitive outcomes in economic 
activities.  
There  are  several  studies  which  have  discussed  the  competitive  aspect  in  Indian 
industries and related it to firm level productivity in post-liberalization period (see, Das and 
Pant  (2006);  Pant  and  Pattanayak  (2005);  Goldar  and  Agarwal  (2004);  Unel  (2003); 
Srivastava et al. (2001), Balakrishnan et al. (2000)). There is however mixed evidence - while 
Unel (2003) confirms that productivity growth accelerated after economic deregulation in 3 
 
1991; Srivastava et al. (2001) and Balakrishnan et al. (2000) find strong evidence of a decline 
in productivity growth rates in 1990s. Similarly, Pant and Pattanayak (2005) have found the 
prevalence of higher monopoly elements in Indian industries in the post liberalization period. 
In another paper, Goldar and Aggarwal (2004) have provided evidence that the price-cost 
margin  has  increased  in  most  of  the  industries  in  post-liberalization  period.  However, 
Pushpangadan and Shanta (2005) provide evidence that out of 14 major Indian industries the 
monopoly  element has increased in two industries, remained the same in two others and 
reduced in the remaining ten industries. 
Despite the significant amount of work on competitiveness and productivity growth of 
Indian industries, there still exist some missing links. Thus, very little attention has been paid 
to  corporate  governance  issues  and  its  influence  on  firm  productivity.  Moreover,  the 
influence of ownership on firm productivity in different competitive environments has been 
rarely examined . Most of the productivity studies for India have considered numerous firm 
specific characteristics without accounting for the institutional structure of production. In a 
recent study, Bartelsman and Doms (2000) have pointed out four factors that are likely to 
influence productivity growth where firm ownership and control has been identified as the 
most important one. Palia and Lichtenberg’s (1999) study suggests that managerial ownership 
changes are positively related to changes in productivity. Their empirical evidence suggests 
that a stock market rewards  firms with higher productivity levels. In this paper, we have 
provided additional evidence by linking corporate governance, product market competition 
and their interaction effect on firm level productivity.  
We have defined governance as synonymous with the exercise of authority, direction 
and control. In the modern corporation, share ownership is one of the important mechanism 
through which one can exercise the control. To note, ownership plays an important role in the 
decision  making  process  of  a  firm.  The  choice  of  input,  technology,  man-power  and 
operational environment is fundamentally a choice made by the dominant owner. Hence, we 
construe corporate governance as the mixture of firm’s control concentration and structure, 
capital  structure  and  their  interaction  with  product  market  competition.  Competition  and 
concentrated  ownership  can  help  in  reducing  the  collective  action  problem  present  in  a 
modern  corporation.  While  trying  to  identify  which  corporate  governance  mechanism  is 
better, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) have remarked that strong legal protection of investors and 
some form of concentrated ownership are essential elements of a good corporate governance 
system. The transaction cost involved in the decision making process of giant corporations 
can be substantially lessened by concentrated ownership structure. In other words, collective 
action problem can be resolved by partial concentration of ownership and control in the hands 
of one or a few large investors (Becht et al., 2003).  
We use total factor productivity as our measure of corporate performance. It is argued 
that productivity is a more reliable measure of firm performance than financial measures as 
accounting  profit  rates  can  be  manipulated  and  stock  prices  can  be  biased.  While  a  few 
studies  have  estimated  production  functions  to  determine  productivity,  the  ‘ownership’ 
variables have  generally  been omitted in  the case of  studies  specific to  India (See, Kato 
(2005)). In general, econometric studies address this problem by including firm specific fixed 
effects.. However, instead of treating this managerial variable as an unobserved firm specific 
effect, we have included the share ownership variable in our productivity estimation. Hence, 
our study attempts to set up an explanatory model for productivity of firms by including both 
internal and external governance mechanisms along with the usual real input variables of 
standard models of productivity estimation. By separately including governance mechanisms 
we try to improve on standard productivity estimation while at the same time answer the 
question of how external governance mechanisms can influence the traditional relationship 4 
 
between  insider  ownership  and  firm  performance.  It  is  our  contention  that  this  latter 
interaction between internal and internal governance mechanisms offers some new results on 
the impact of  institutions on firm governance. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section II of the paper discusses 
existing literature on ownership and competition and Section III extends this by providing 
evidences on mutual interaction of the duo. Section IV lays out the basic hypotheses of the 
study. Empirical model is specified in section V followed by a discussion of data source and 
variable creation in Section VI. Main result of the study is discussed in Section VII and VIII. 
Section IX presents evidence on the interaction effect between product market completion 
and insider ownership. Section X concludes the paper. 
       
II.  THEORETICAL BACKGROUND  
Since Berle and Mean’s (1932) seminal thesis on the separation of ownership from 
control,  a  large  amount  of  work  has  been  done  on  the  dispersion  of  ownership  and  the 
resulting separation of ownership and control. Examination of the effects of different types of 
owners has become a primary area of research in the literature. The convergence of interest or 
incentive alignment argument states that firm performance is an increasing function of insider 
share ownership (Jensen and Meckling, 1976).  The separation of ownership and control 
creates  an  agency  conflict.  The  agency  cost  will  be  limited  if  the  owner-manager  holds 
substantial amount of share in the firm.  The logical concomitant of this hypothesis is that 
there  is  a  ‘steady  positive  relationship’  between  management  or  insider  ownership  and 
corporate  value.  The  reward  argument  predicts  a  positive  relationship  between  insider 
ownership and firm performance. This suggests that firms reward their managers with equity 
ownership for their strong past performance (Kole, 1996).  
Cho  (1998)  has  stated  that  ‘other  things  being  equal,  managers  may  prefer  equity 
compensation when they expect their firm to perform. As a result, higher levels of insider 
ownership  are  expected  in  firms  with  high  corporate  values’.  Cho’s  prediction  is 
fundamentally different from Kole’s argument so far as timing is concerned because Kole 
emphasizes the relationship between past performance and present ownership whereas Cho 
predicts the relationship between expected performance and current ownership.  
The  second  line  of  argument  predicts  a  negative  relationship  between  insider 
shareholding and firm value. When insiders hold a lower amount of equity and shareholders 
are  too  dispersed  to  take  action  against  non-value  maximization  behaviour,  insiders  may 
deploy  corporate  assets  to  obtain  personal  benefits  such  as  shirking  and  perquisite 
consumption.  Also  as  Demsetz  (1983)  and  Fama  and  Jensen  (1983)  point  out,  insiders 
holding a substantial portion of a firm’s equity may have enough voting power to ensure that 
their position inside the company is protected. As a result, they may become to a great extent 
insulated from external disciplining forces such as the takeover threat or the managerial labor 
market.  Morck,  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (MSV,  1988)  have  named  this  as  the  entrenchment 
effect. However the question arises if the insider is the majority owner, then as per incentive 
alignment  thesis  he/she  should  endeavour  to  maximize  profit.  But,  isn’t  it  too  much 
generalization of managerial/insider behaviour? The manager may become increasingly less 
motivated by money as his wealth increases. Things such as ‘power’, ‘prestige’, ‘empire 
building’ may be equally or possibly more important for an extremely wealthy person. 
There is another string of argument which says the relationship is cyclical. Thus, Stulz 
(1988)  has  developed  a  formal  model  of  an  inverse  U-shaped  relationship  between 
management  ownership  (through  voting  rights)  and  firm  performance.  Firm  performance 5 
 
tends to rise at marginal increment in managerial share at the beginning. However, it falls and 
reaches its minimum when the manager/insider holds more than fifty percent share in a firm. 
Stulz’s analysis revolves around the takeover premium argument. The basic argument is that 
insiders with higher levels of ownership are positioned to oppose takeover threat from the 
market because of which the acquirer has to pay higher takeover premiums to increase the 
likelihood of the success of the takeovers. But, with higher levels of managerial ownership 
the possibility of successful takeover diminishes and therefore firm performance starts to 
decline after a sufficiently high level of ownership. Firm performance reaches its minimum 
when  insider  shareholding  is  around  fifty  percent  in  the  firm  because  with  majority 
ownership the chances of successful takeover become dim.  
Demsetz has gone a step ahead and argued that ownership structure is an endogenous 
outcome  of  several  competitive  processes  so  that  there  is  no  a  priori  linkage  between 
managerial ownership and firm performance. Demsetz (1983), Demsetz and  Lehn (1985), 
Demsetz  and  Villalonga  (2001)  and  Kole  and  Lehn  (1997)  have  argued  for  such  a 
relationship. Their basic argument is that ownership structure with insufficient performance 
will fail to survive in the long run. Demsetz (1983) has put a strong criticism against Berle 
and Means (1932) thesis that an inverse correlation exists between diffussion of ownership 
and firm performance. In another paper, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) have argued that the 
ownership structure of a firm is an endogenous outcome of decisions that reflect the influence 
of shareholders and of stock market trading. The ownership structure that emerges, whether 
concentrated or diffused, is influenced by profit maximizing interest of the shareholders, so 
that there is no systematic relationship between variation in ownership and performance.  
Despite the varied theoretical viewpoints, empirical studies provide ample evidence 
that ownership matters and the economic performance of the firm is influenced by allocation 
of property rights. On the other hand, the  influence of different governance mechanisms is 
rarely understood. Different types of shareholders have divergent abilities or incentives to 
monitor management. Thus, not only concentration of ownership but  also its structure is 
important for firm performance. The behaviour of insiders would be different if the market 
for corporate  control  is  very strong. Similarly, the performance of managers or directors 
would be greatly predictable if they operate in an industry which is highly competitive. In the 
next section, we will discuss the influence of competition on firm performance, specifically 
linking ownership, competition and productivity. 
Product market competition is an important external governance mechanism. It could 
limit managerial discretion. Micro-economic theory suggests that competition forces prices to 
equal marginal cost, which brings about allocative efficiency. Competition in the product 
market ensures that best firms in the industry survive and also fosters managerial incentive to 
perform. Therefore, if the product market is sufficiently competitive, management will be 
constrained to act in accordance with shareholders’ interests, or else succumb to bankruptcy. 
In the literature it is argued that competition can reduce agency problems between 
owners  and  managers  ((Alchian  (1950);  Stigler  (1958)).  Hart  (1983)  has  differentiated 
between the entrepreneurial firm and the managerial firm and shows a reduction in cost of 
production when the managerial firm competes with the entrepreneurial firm. Schmidt (1997) 
argues that increasing competition has two effects on the manager’s optimal effort. Greater 
competition  lowers  the  price  that  the  firm  receives  for  its  output  and,  ceteris  paribus, 
increases the risk that the owner will find it optimal to liquidate the firm. Therefore, the 
manager  has  an  increased  incentive  to  work  harder  to  avoid  liquidation.  However,  since 
increased competition reduces profits and hence  the benefits of a cost reduction. The owner 
may not be interested to pay the manager the high rents necessary to achieve a cost reduction. 6 
 
In the Schumpeterian firm widening price-cost margin acts as an incentive to innovation. As 
competition lowers the margin, it may retard the pace of firm growth due to lower R&D 
expenditure  thus  innovation.  Smirlock  and  Marshall  (1983)  have  expressed  doubt  on  the 
efficacy of competition : costly monitoring and difficulties in enforcement of contracts may 
not completely eliminate managerial discretionary behaviour in a competitive market. 
 
III.  INTERACTION OF COMPETITION AND GOVERNANCE  
In governance studies, though it is imperative to examine the degree of influence of 
different variables on firm performance it also makes sense to study their mutual interaction. 
Independently they can constrain the managerial discretion or can induce mangers/insiders to 
align  their  interest  with  shareholders  interest.  At  the  same  time  there  may  be  some 
complementarity  or  substitutability  relation  between  different  variables.  Specifically, 
competition  and  corporate  governance  indicators  may  jointly  move  in  a  direction  or  in 
opposite  direction  while  affecting  productivity.  When  they  move  in  the  same  (opposite) 
direction,  we  say  they  are  complements  (substitutes)  to  each  other.  Product  market 
competition restricts managerial discretion and therefore acts as an alternate mechanism to 
other  corporate  governance  devices.  Also,  it  can  strengthen  certain  market  forces.  For 
example, higher competition can dampen the corporate profit, thereby eroding market value 
of shares. It may signal for a corporate takeover, thereby putting pressure on managers to 
perform  well (Roe  (2004)). When the devices  are complementary, the impact  of product 
market competition would be greater in firms with an efficient governance structure. 
The substitution effect implies that when corporate governance is weak competition 
plays an important role as a disciplinary device forcing mangers to improve performance and 
reduce slack. On the other hand, if competition and corporate governance were complements, 
product market competition might not alone be sufficient to reduce productive inefficiencies 
in  an  environment  with  poor  corporate  governance.  A  number  of  theoretical  papers 
investigate the effects of competition and corporate governance on firm performance. Aghion 
and Howitt (1997) and Aghion et al. (1999) develop a model in which competition appears as 
a substitute to good corporate governance  measured by financial pressure at the firm level. 
On the contrary, Holmström and Milogrom (1994) analyze initiative and various incentive 
mechanisms as complementary in a multitask principal-agent framework.  
The empirical evidence is not unambiguous in its findings. Nickell et al. (1997) find 
that financial pressure and dominant shareholder control from the financial sector act as a 
(weak) substitute for product market competition in case of UK firms. They find rent to be 
negatively related to total factor productivity (TFP) growth whereas interest payment and 
dominant shareholder control are positively related to total factor productivity growth. They 
confirm that the last two factors can substitute for competition. The impact of competition on 
productivity performance is lower when firms are under financial pressure or when they have 
a  dominant  external  shareholder.  Januszewski  et  al.  (1999)  find  that  firms  in  highly 
competitive industries have higher rates of productivity growth. Furthermore, they confirm 
competition  has  a  positive  effect  on  productivity  growth  for  those  firms  which  have 
concentrated share ownership (complementary effect). In another study, Grosfeld and Tressel 
(2001) have studied the interaction effect of governance and competition for the Warsaw 
Stock Exchange listed firms. They find competition to positively influencing productivity. 
They  confirm  that  the  impact  of  product  market  competition  depends  on  the  ownership 
structure.  Thus,  product  market  competition  has  a  significant  impact  on  productivity  in 
companies whose ownership structure is highly dispersed or highly concentrated.  7 
 
In case of China, Hu et al. (2004) find that ownership, corporate governance and 
competition are important predictors of firm performance. When they examine joint effect of 
the  above  three  variables,  ownership  and  corporate  governance  turned  out  to  be  more 
important than competition. They find some substitutability between private ownership and 
competition.  Li and Niu (2006) find moderate concentrated ownership and product market 
competition are complementary as also relative dispersed ownership and competition. They 
find evidence of a substitution effect between highly concentrated ownership and competition 
i.e., firms with high concentrated ownership in a competitive environment tend to be less 
productive. Koke (2001) has found complementary effect between concentrated ownership 
and  competition  for  German  firms.  They  found  that  when  owner  control  is  strong, 
competitive pressure boosts higher productivity growth. In a subsequent study, Koke and 
Renneboog (2005) found  a  differential  effect  of competition  and ownership  for U.K and 
German firms. In the case of U.K, weak product market competition has a negative impact on 
productivity growth of profitable widely held firms. Block holder control has no impact on 
the productivity growth in firms which are subject to strong competition, but the presence of 
larger  block  holders  like  insiders  reduces  the  negative  impact  of  weak  competition.  The 
relation between strong block holder control and productivity growth is limited in case of 
German  profitable  firms.  However,  controlling  banks,  insurance  firms,  and  government 
stakes are able to reduce the negative effects of weak product market competition. 
 
IV.  MAJOR HYPOTHESIS 
Empirical  evidence and theoretical  studies suggest  that competition has  a  positive 
effect on firm productivity. Competition in firm’s product market is a very influential force 
for ensuring good corporate governance. Even in the presence of weak internal monitoring, 
high product market competition may ensure that management does not shirk. Competition 
provides  a  benchmark  to  measure  manager/insiders  performance.  Higher  product  market 
competition forces the managers/insiders to focus on high performance, because if they do 
not, it would ultimately result in bankruptcy and closure of the firm. Increasing the chances 
of  bankruptcy,  competition  incites  the  insiders  to  greater  effort  allowing  costs  reduction 
necessary to avoid bankruptcy. Also, competition has severe reputational implications. Since 
the firm’s performance would be compared with its peers, it puts lots of moral pressure on the 
family/insiders to perform. On the basis of above argument, we hypothesize that: 
  Competition has a positive effect on productivity 
  Higher amount of insider ownership has a positive effect on firm 
productivity 
  The impact of insider ownership on firm productivity is stronger 
when competition in firm’s product market is intense 
Public financial institutions act as lenders and investors in India. While Mutual funds 
and  foreign  institutional  investors  are  the  investment  institutions,  domestic  financial 
institutions (DFIs) like IDBI, IFCI, ICICI and banks are the leading lending institutions.
1 It is 
                                                           
1 The Industrial Finance Corporation of India (IFCI) was established in 1948. Its counter parts at the state level – 
the State Financial Corporations were established in 1951. The National Industrial Development Corporation 
(NIDC) was floated in 1954. The Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India (ICICI) was set-up in 
1955. The Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI) was established in 1964 as the main institution of long 
and medium term finance.  8 
 
argued  that  in  India  government  owned  financial  institutions  have  distorted  objective 
functions (Goswami, (2003)). The purpose of setting up of Development financial institutions 
in India is to foster industrialization. The Narasimhan Committee in 1991 have acknowledged 
that DFI loans had not been monitored for decades. Therefore, the quantum of debt is the 
performance measurement criteria for them rather than quality of loans. The amount of stock 
ownership by DFIs in companies is more of a political decisions rather than driven by high 
powered  business  incentives.  However,  institutional  investors  can  exert  pressure  on 
management  by  offloading  large  amount  of  shares.  As  they  have  commitment  to  their 
investors, they shall ensure that the firm is getting managed in the most efficient manner and 
the  resource  allocation  is  optimal  to  get  best  output.  Besides,  the  efficient  monitoring 
hypothesis (Pound, 1988) proposes a positive relation between institutional investors share 
ownership and firm performance. Thus, we hypothesize that: 
  Development  financial  institutions’  shareholding  has  a  negative 
effect and institutional investors’ share holding a positive effect on 
firm productivity. 
It is argued that debt acts as a bonding mechanism between shareholders and mangers. 
By putting constraint on the free cash flow, debt aligns the interest of the manager with 
shareholders. The signalling argument proposes a positive relation between higher amount of 
debt and firm value as investors read larger amounts of leverage as a signal of higher quality 
firm. This is because debt is a contractual obligation to repay interest and principal. Failures 
to payment can lead to bankruptcy and managers may lose their jobs.  However, in India most 
of lending institutions are government owned. They have a soft budget constraint. Therefore, 
the  threat  of  bankruptcy  is  very  poor.  Financial  institutions  have  reduced  incentives  for 
monitoring  their  debtor  firms.  The  managers  of  such  firms  may  undertake  negative  net 
present  value  projects  or  involve  in  discretionary  spending.    Second,  due  to  larger 
accumulation of public debt, the companies appear vulnerable to interest rate or other macro-
economic  shocks.  Larger  accumulation  of  debt  sometimes  prove  to  be  a  deterrent  to 
undertake positive net present value projects due to unavailability of fresh loans. Therefore, 
though debt may positively affect firm value as it is based on investors’ perception, it may 
negatively affect the productivity. Koke (2001; 2005) has found positive effect of bank debt 
on productivity. Nickell et al. (1999) have found a positive impact of financial pressure on 
firm  productivity.  Kato  (2005)  has  found  a  negative  relation  between  debt  intensity  and 
productivity in case of India. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
  Financial  pressure  or  debt  concentration  has  negative  effect  on 
productivity in India. 
V.  EMPIRICAL MODEL SPECIFICATION 
Productivity  of  a  firm  is  determined  by  several  factors  including  competitive 
environment and ownership structure. The more apparent measure of productivity is the ratio 
of  outputs  to  inputs.  Since  the  firm  employs  several  inputs,  there  are  different  ways  of 
explaining productivity. In this study, we have used  total factor productivity as is typical in 
the existing literature. 
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Total factor productivity (TFP) is defined as output per unit of total input, where total 
input is the weighted sum of the individual inputs:  ( , )
it
it
Y A f k l  . Here, A denotes TFP, 
( , ) f k l denotes total input,  l denotes labour input, and  k  denotes capital input. Rearranging 
the above equation, we can obtain a production function which is: * ( , ) it it it it Y A f k l  . This 
explains that output produced is determined by the quantities of inputs employed and the 
efficiency of the producer. Assuming  (.) f as a Cobb-Douglas production function, we can 
write: * it it it it Y A l k
  .  Taking  logarithms  we  can  express  this  as:
ln ln ln ln it it it it it it y A l k     .  
If the technical parameters    and     are invariant across firms and TFP is varying 
across  firms  and  unobservable,  we  can  write  the  above  eq uation  as: 
ln ln ln it it it it y l k u      where ln it it uA  . Hence, we can hypothesize that productivity,
it u , is related to insider ownership and competition by some functional form  (.) g . Now we 
can  express  the  above  equation  as:ln ln ln (.) it it it it it y l k g e        (where
ln (.) it it it it A u g e    ).  So, it g  embodies  all  factors  that  affect  productivity  level.  We  can 
express it as: it it gX   , that is the level of total factor productivity is a function of  it X  
variables. The specification thus becomes -  ln ln ln it it it it it y X l k e          .  it X  is a 
vector of variables that  could affect the productivity level of a firm and  it e  is a random 
disturbance term, capturing all other shocks.  Including industry dummy, i  , and time dummy
t  ,  the  model  can  be  expressed  as  :  ln ln ln it i t it it it it y X l k e              .  In 
Appendix-1,  we  have  explained  each  of  the  explanatory  variables  in  detail.  As  we  have 
discussed earlier the focus of our study are the variables included in Xit and represent the 
institutional factors that impact productivity. These institutional factors include both internal 
and external governance mechanisms. 
 
VI.  DATA, EMPIRICAL RESULT AND ANALYSIS 
The data is obtained from  Prowess, a database provided by the Centre for Monitoring 
the Indian economy (CMIE). The initial sample consists of 1,833 listed firms for the period 
2000-01 to 2003-04. Firms for which there is no shareholding data, stock price data and sales 
data  are  dropped  from  the  sample.  We  have  not  included  firms  which  are  classified  as 
diversified in terms of products produced which resulted in dropping of 26 firms (i.e., 104 
firm years). Firms for which gross fixed assets, gross value added or wages and salaries are 
missing are also dropped for the final estimation. 
To  measure  corporate  governance,  this  study  used  data  on  ownership  structure, 
leverage and business group information. The main variable used to measure ownership is the 
share holding amount by insiders/promoters. In the governance structure of Indian corporates, 
insiders/promoters plays a larger role. In the context of India, promoter control, founding 
family control, ownership control, ownership concentration, and management control have 
the same connotation. The promoter/family characterizes a distinctive class of shareholders 
with  poorly  diversified  portfolios,  is  a  long  term  investor  and  often  controls  senior 
management. Since the state run financial institutions rarely go against the promoters, the 
decision making process in the firm is more or less determined by this class of shareholders 
(Varma, 1997). It is argued that the problem of corporate governance in India is not that of 10 
 
disciplining management rather it is of disciplining dominant shareholder. Promoters are the 
dominant shareholder in India. Therefore, it is imperative to study the impact of this class of 
shareholders on firm productivity. 
Another ownership variable of equal interest is  institutional investors. Institutional 
investors being a major block holder in a company can influence firm performance. They can 
exert influence through voice option or exit option. The greater amount of shareholding by 
institutional investors makes monitoring more rational. However, they can sell their stock 
holding instead of intervening when they find large scale managerial  problems.  In India, 
institutional investors have greater equity exposure in companies and therefore the potential 
for institutional monitoring is greater than it is in  market-dominated economies like the US 
and UK. Besides that, we have included three more ownership variables representing  foreign 
ownership,  development  finance  institutions  (DFIs)  and  Corporate  ownership.  We  have 
included the capital structure variable which is measured as total borrowings to total assets. 
Also, the alternative measure of leverage has been used which we will discuss later. 
To measure product market competition, we have created four variables i.e., CR4, 
Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI), Rent and Market Share (MKT-SH). To note here, CR4 
and HHI are the most important variables through which we have captured incentive power 
of market discipline. The concentration index, CR4, is defined as the sum of the four firm’s 
share in their respective product market (defined by NIC-2 digit output).
2 It is very difficult to 
determine what the relevant market is for a firm. Though a 4 or 5 digit NIC classifications 
will be a more precise proxy for the firm’s market, it will be too restrictive for a significant 
proportion  of  firms  which  operate  in  2,  3  or  4  digit  industries.  If  we  identify  a  firm  as 
belonging to 4 digit industries, we assume that all sales are realized in this sector. However, a 
part  of  firm’s  product  may  belong  to  2  or  3  digit  group.  Therefore,  there  will  be 
overstatement of firm’s market power in 4 digit industries. On the contrary, such problems 
won’t arise if we use 2-digit market share as it does not overstate the market power of the 
firm (Grosfeld and Tressel, 2001). 
The  higher  the  concentration  ratio,  the  greater  is  the  monopoly  power  or  market 
concentration in the existing industry. The Herfindahl-Hirschman index (HHI) is defined as 





  where / ii p q Q  ,  i q  
is output of ith firm and Qis total output of all the firms in the industry. The maximum value 
for this index is one where only one firm occupies the market. The HHI will be minimum 
(i.e., 1/n) when the n firms in the industry hold an identical share. HHI is a widely accepted 
index as it takes account of all the firms and their relative sizes. Both CR4 and HHI are 
inverse  measure  of  competition  because  the  higher  the  ratio,  the  less  competitive  is  the 
industry/market. 
Another variable ‘rent’ has been constructed to measure competition in firm’s product 
market. It can be interpreted as an ex-post measure of market power. It exhibits above normal 
profit which reflects the overall extent of competition faced by a firm. The firms can generate 
higher rent only if they operate in a less competitive environment. In a highly competitive 
environment, rents from production activities will be less. Rent is defined as total sales less 
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  ,  where  p i=market share of ith   
firm in descending order. The normal practice is to take four firm concentration ratio. However, if the 
number of firms in the industry is more, one can calculate 8 firm or 10 firm concentration ratio. 11 
 
labour, raw material, power and capital cost normalized by gross value added (Koke, 2001; 
Kato, 2005).
3   
The firm’s output, it y , is defined as gross value added, deflated by using whole sale 
price index with base year 1993-94. The firm’s capital,  it k , is defined as gross fixed assets, 
deflated  using  machinery  and  machine  tools  price  index  with  base  year  1993-94.  As  a 
robustness check we have generated capital stock variable which is defined as 01 () tt k k k   , 
deflated by machinery and machine tools price index. We have taken gross fixed assets of 
year 2000 as 0 k .
4 The firm’s labour input,  l, is defined as wages and salaries, deflated by 
consumer price index of industrial workers with base year 1993-94. Labour can be measured 
as number of employees, amount of man-hours (years) or in terms of wages (Varagunasingh, 
1993). The Prowess database does not provide historical data on number of employees. Some 
of the researchers have done a mapping with Annual Survey of Industries (ASI) data to arrive 
at employee numbers (see, Pant and Pattanayak, 2005 for the methodology). However, the 
major  shortcoming  of  this  approach  is  the  assumption  of  uniformity  of  wage  rate  in  a 
particular industry. Also, ASI does not cover a lot of industries; therefore imputing their wage 
bill by similar industry group is another arbitrariness of the approach. Therefore, we have 
used employee cost of the firm for labour.
5 Other control variables are defined in Appendix-1. 
VII.  ANALYSIS OF THE DESCRIPTIVE RESULT 
We  begin  our  analysis  with  some  preliminary  evidence  based  on  a  measure  of 
productivity.  We  estimate  a  standard  two  factor  Cobb-Douglas  production  function  with 
gross value added (GVA) as the dependent variable and labour and capital as independent 
variables. We take the residuals from this regression as a measure of relative productivity 
(i.e., relative to the regression line). We have included time and two digit industry dummies 
to account for temporal and cross-sectional shocks. 
To  understand  the  relationship  between  competition  and  productivity,  we  provide 
industry-wise productivity and concentration in Table 1. Here, we explain at an aggregate 
level the association between productivity and sector-wise concentration. The average level 
of concentration (i.e., CR4) in the Indian industry is 53 percent with median value of 50 
percent. This suggests a gradual evolution to a moderate competitive environment of Indian 
industry. Out of 43 industries, there are 22 industries where CR4 is less than or equal to 50 
percent and 5 industries where CR4 is less than 30 percent. On the basis of both the measures 
(i.e.,  CR4  and  HHI),  industries  such  as  Food  and  Beverages,  Textiles,  Chemical  and 
Electrical Machinery are highly competitive. On the other hand, industries such as Oil and 
Gas, Mining and Tobacco are highly non-competitive. However, these industries were in the 
past dominated by public sector firms. There are a few private players in such industries 
because of which they show a  high level of concentration. 
   
                                                           
3 Capital cost has been calculated as: total capital*user cost of capital. User cost of capital is proxied by 
prime lending rate of India’s largest commercial bank (SBI) minus  inflation plus a constant depreciation 
rate (7.1%). Total capital is defined by net worth plus total borrowings. 
4 For year-2001, we have taken GFA of year-2000 as K0 and the differential quantity of GFA in year-2001 
and year-2000 as Investment. The sum of K0 and I is capital stock for year-2001. 
5 Also, Ray (2004) and Caves and Bailey (1992) have used employee cost as proxy for labour. 12 
 
Table 1. Sectoral Measures of Competition and Productivity 
        Sector Name  Average 
Productivity (+,-) 
CR4  HHI 
  Agriculture, Hunting and Related Activities  +  0.3557  0.0529 
  Mining of Coal and Lignite; Extraction of Peat  +  0.6767  0.2089 
  Extraction of Crude petroleum and Natural gas; Service activities incidental to oil 
and gas extraction, excluding surveying 
-  0.9850  0.8055 
  Mining of Metal Ores  -  0.8597  0.1909 
  Other Mining and Quarrying  +  0.5007  0.0956 
  Manufacture of Food Products and Beverages  +  0.1531  0.0128 
  Manufacture of Tobacco Products  -  0.9490  0.6203 
  Manufacture of Textiles  +  0.1286  0.0108 
  Manufacturing of Wearing Apparel, Dressing and Dying of Fur  +  0.3001  0.0525 
  Tanning and Dressing of Leather, Manufacture of Luggage, Handbags, Saddlery 
and Footwear 
+  0.6272  0.1853 
  Manufacture of Wood and of products of wood and cork, except furniture, 
Manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting Materials 
+  0.5693  0.1104 
  Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products  +  0.3685  0.0566 
  Publishing, Printing and reproduction of Recorded Media  -  0.5512  0.1225 
  Manufacture of Coke, Refined Petroleum products and Nuclear Fuel  +  0.8736  0.2372 
  Manufacture of Chemicals and Chemical Products  +  0.2007  0.0166 
  Manufacture of Rubber and Plastic Products  +  0.3625  0.0438 
  Manufacture of Other Non Metallic Products  +  0.3215  0.0401 
  Manufacture of Basic Metals  +  0.3952  0.0631 
  Manufacture of Fabricated Metal Products, Except Machinery and Equipments  +  0.3686  0.0502 
  Manufacture of Machinery and Equipment  +  0.3516  0.0654 
  Manufacture of office, accounting and Computing Machinery  +  0.6285  0.1287 
  Manufacture of Electrical Machinery and Apparatus  -  0.2923  0.0346 
  Manufacture of Radio, television and Communication Equipments and apparatus  +  0.4661  0.0772 
  Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks  +  0.4692  0.0957 
  Manufacture of Motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers  +  0.5078  0.0825 
  Manufacture of other Transport equipment  +  0.7489  0.1638 
  Manufacture of furniture, manufacturing  +  0.3882  0.0665 
  Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply  +  0.5265  0.1305 
  Construction  +  0.3818  0.1177 
  Wholesale Trade and commission Trade, Except of Motor Vehicles and motor 
cycles 
+  0.3989  0.0635 
 








  Hotels and Restaurants  +  0.4247  0.0680 
  Land Transport, Transport via pipelines  +  0.5988  0.2741 
  Water Transport  -  0.7860  0.2660 
  Supporting and Auxiliary Transport activities, Activities of Travel agencies  +  0.8616  0.2401 
  Post and Telecommunication  +  0.8512  0.3520 
  Financial Intermediation, Except insurance and Pension Funging  +  0.2892  0.0413 
  Activities auxiliary to financial intermediation  +  0.7780  0.3597 
  Real Estate Activities  +  0.7368  0.2123 
  Computer and Related Activities  +  0.4876  0.0715 
  Other Business Activities  +  0.4981  0.0863 
  Health and Social Work  +  0.7371  0.2630 
  Recreational, cultural and sporting activities  +  0.4721  0.0913 
Notes: Productivity is approximated by the residuals from the pooled OLS estimation of a two factor Cobb-
Douglas production function including time and two digit industry dummies. Industry level average has been 
taken to arrive at the final number. 13 
 
 
In column 2 of the table, we have reported the direction of average productivity at the 
industry  level.  The  four  year  average  (2001  to  2004)  of  productivity  shows  that  all  the 
industries  have positive productivity except few like Oil and Gas, Tobacco, Recorded Media, 
Electrical Machinery and water transport. It is to be observed that these industries  have the 
highest level of concentration except electrical machinery. Therefore, this provides an ad-hoc 
evidence that industries which are non-competitive tend to have lower average productivity. 
In Table 2 the relationship between insider ownership, competition and productivity 
has been shown. We have defined an industry as competitive if its concentration ratio (CR4) 
is less than median concentration (i.e., CR4<=0.4982). When insider ownership is more than 
40 percent and the industry is competitive, the average productivity level is positive. Only 
when promoter share is 10-20 percent and 30-40 percent, the average productivity level is 
negative. In case of non-competitive industries, productivity is negative even while insider 
ownership stake is quite large i.e., more than 75 percent. This provides some indication of the 
complementarity between competition and insider ownership. Firms under large insider share 
have positive productivity in competitive industries. In case of non-competitive industries, 
the productivity and share ownership do not seem to have a linear relationship. 
 







0-10  +  + 
10-20  -  - 
20-30  +  - 
30-40  -  - 
40-50  +  + 
50-75  +  + 
75-100  +  - 
Notes: An industry is defined as competitive if its concentration ratio is less than or equal to the median 
concentration level which is 0.4982. 
As a further check, we have examined the level of productivity when insiders have 
majority stake in a firm (i.e., >51 percent). In a competitive industry when insider have more 
than 51 percent stake, the productivity level is 2.8 percentages more in comparison to non-
competitive industry. When insiders have less than 51 percent stake in a firm, productivity 
level is low in competitive as well as non-competitive industries. Finally, we examined the 
productivity difference between group and standalone firms. It is seen that standalone firms 
are more productive than group firms and the mean difference is statistically significant.  
VIII.  DESCRIBING ESTIMATION RESULT 
In this section, we examine the effects of ownership and competition on productivity 
levels. All regressions are estimated using the fixed effects method (least square dummy 
variable). The coefficients on year and industry dummies are not reported. In table 3, we have 
used CR4 as the measure of competition. The model-1 is our baseline specification where we 
include  only  labour,  capital  and  ownership  variables.  The  model  is  highly  statistically 
significant with adjusted R-square value of 0.86. We observe that input share of labour in 
model-1 is 0.71 and input share of capital 0.33. Both the variables are highly significant. This 
finding is consistent with the result of Palia and Lichtenberg (1999) in case of US firms. The 
insider ownership variable (INS) is found to be positive and significant. To investigate the 14 
 
non-linear relationship between insider ownership and firm productivity, we have introduced  
quadratic and cubic terms for insider ownership.
6 We find the higher order terms are highly 
insignificant.  Thus,  linear  specification  better  captures  the  relationship  between  insider 
ownership and firm productivity than any form of non -linear specification. Moreover, the 
result remains invariant to the changes in capital stock variables. 
In model-1, the next ownership varia ble is institutional investors’ share (IINV). In 
India among institutional investors, mutual funds, UTI and insurance companies hold the 
maximum amount of shares. The prime concern of institutional investors is to increase the 
value of their portfolio. Therefore, they can be very opportunistic and offload the shares of 
the companies at the slightest sign of irregularity. As the voice option is costlier than exit 
option,  they  may  prefer  to  change  their  portfolio  allocations  rather  than  directly  affect 
governance  of  the  company.  Sometimes  they  can  be  very  short-sighted  and  may  try  to 
maximize the value of shares of their customers without performing their monitoring role as 
large investors. However, we found a positive and significant sign of institutional investors 
(IINV)  in  model-1.  The  positive  relationship  between  productivity  and  IINV’s  share 
ownership draws attention to their monitoring role as major block holder. 
The study finds a significantly negative association between Development financial 
institutions (DFI’s) shareholding and total factor productivity (TFP). DFIs are setup with the 
objective to provide long term finance to the firms. However due to soft budget constraint 
and distorted or political objectives, they have failed to generate the necessary incentives for 
managers to boost firm productivity. The DFIs are evaluated on the basis of quantity of loans 
they have disbursed rather than the quality of loans. The choice to be the shareholder of a 
company  is  more  or  less  a  political  decision.  The  nominee  directors  of  DFIs  play  an 
insignificant role in the board meeting and with their support promoters of Indian companies 
sometimes  enjoy  managerial  control  with  very  little  equity  investment  of  their  own 
(Charkrabarti, 2005). In such firms because of low cash flow rights and higher control rights, 
the insiders have little interest/incentive to manage the company properly. They can divert the 
resources to the company where they have higher amount of ownership stake (Patibandla, 
2006; Chakrabarti, 2005). Hence, the negative relationship shows the poor monitoring role 
played by DFIs in the governance structure of a firm. 
 
   
                                                           
6  The  result  is  not  reported  in  a  table  format  for  the  sake  of brevity.  In  the  quadratic  equation,  the 
estimates of INS and INS2 are 0.21 with P-value of 0.41 and 0.28 with P-value of 0.24 respectively. In the 
cubic specification though the significance level increased marginally in model-1, it is not stable. When we 
have introduced the cubic term in the fully specified model-2, we found all the insider ownership variable 
to be highly insignificant. 15 
 
 
Table 3. Effects of Ownership and Competition (i.e., CR4) on Productivity 
VARIABLE  DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LN(GVA) 
INDUSTRY FIXED EFFECTS 
MOD-1  MOD-2  MOD-3 
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Adj. R-square  0.8620  0.9189  0.9191 






Year & Industry Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs.  6638  6634  6634 
Notes: 
  Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using White’s 
heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix. 
  *  indicates  significance  at  5  percent  level,  **  indicates  significance  at  10  percent  level,  §  indicates 
significance at 15 percent level. 
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The  coefficient  of  corporate  ownership  variable  (CORPORATE)  is  positive  and 
statistically significant. This implies inter-corporate ownership has a positive impact on firm 
productivity. Companies generally hold shares in firms where they have a strategic interest. It 
The  financial  pressure  is  substantially  reduced  because  of  inter-corporate  lending  and 
investment.  Sometimes  such  kinds  of  pyramidal  ownership  and  cross-holdings  bring 
deviation in cash flow and control rights. Inter-corporate shareholding may facilitate inter-
corporate  transfer  of  resources  to  the  detrimental  of  minority  shareholders.  Also,  due  to 
collusion among top management of companies, the threat of takeover becomes weak. In our 
study, the positive estimate of corporate ownership indicates the performance enhancing role 
played by the corporate shareholder. 
We found a positive influence of foreign ownership (FOREIGN) on firm productivity. 
The size of the point estimate is larger than any other ownership variable.
7 Since foreign 
ownership also represents foreign institutional investors (FII), it indicates the performance 
monitoring role played by FIIs.
8In model-2, we have included competition, leverage and 
other control variables. To measure competition, CR4 variable is used in the model.
9 The sign 
of CR4 is negative which implies higher the industry concentration; lower is the productivity 
level of firms. However, we find the variable to be insignificant in the model. It indicates 
competition  per se  does  not  have  any  disciplinary  effect  and    does  not  enhance  firm 
productivity. This finding is being supported by the empirical evidence provided by Koke 
(2001). In this model and in the subsequent models, the IINV variable becomes insignificant. 
Hence, institutional investors may not contribute to the enhancement of firm productivity. 
They can influence firm value through their large scale sale and purchase of shares. But, their 
influence  on  firm  productivity  is  very  negligible  or  statistically  insignificant.The  other 
variable of interest is business group indicator (G ROUP). The dummy variable (i.e., 1 -
GROUP, 0-others) is insignificant which means group or network structure does not have any 
impact on productivity.  
Firm size is measured by natural logarithm of sales i.e., Ln(S). As per economies of 
scale and scope argument, firm size and productivity is positively associated. Here, we find a 
positive and statistically significant relationship between firm size and productivity. With 
respect  to  other  control  variables,  research  and  development  intensity  (R&D)  and 
advertisement intensity (ADV) have positive impact on firm productivity. Firms with higher 
R&D intensity are expected to have higher productivity as high R&D firms are more 
foresighted  and  have  a  higher  scope  for  innovation.  The  development  of  cost -cutting 
technology is possible only in high R&D firms. Similarly, advertisement expenditure is a soft 
capital. Higher amount of advertisement spending helps in building brand name and develop 
customer-loyalty. Though we cannot establish a priori a relationship between advertisement 
and productivity, we find a positive association in this study. 
                                                           
7 When we have checked the standardized estimates of each ownership variable, the beta estimate of 
foreign ownership is marginally higher than insider ownership and corporate ownership. However, there 
is a large difference between the estimates of IINV and Foreign. Foreign ownership estimate is 5 times 
larger than IINV estimates. DFI’s estimate is significantly negative. 
8 Just for robustness check, we have estimated another model where we have taken only manufacturing 
sector firms. We find no change in the sign of the estimates. Also, the changes in the size and significance 
of the variable are very minimal. Hence, for our further analysis, we have taken all the industries into 
account except firms categorized as diversified. 
9 CR4 is four-firm concentration ratio. It is the sum total of four firms share in their respective indu stry 
group. 17 
 
In the post-reform era, the scope of importing capital goods has increased in India. 
Recently  Ray  (2004)  and  Goldar  et  al.,  (2004)  have  found  that  import  intensity  and 
technology  import  payment  intensity  have  a  positive  impact  on  firm  productivity  and 
efficiency. Since liberalization of external controls and  removal of quantitative restrictions 
on  capital  goods,  the  access  of  Indian  companies  to  the  outside  world  has  increased 
tremendously. Due to imports of materials and machineries with advanced technology, it is 
expected that the productivity level will increase. In this study, we have taken import of 
capital goods intensity (CAPIMP-INT) as a predictor of firm productivity. The estimated 
relationship suggests that firms with higher level of imported capital goods  have  higher 
productivity. 
We measure vertical integration (VERTICAL) of a firm by the ratio of gross value 
added to value of output (Goldar et al., 2004). There are several studies which indicate a 
higher  performance  of  vertically  integrated  firms  (Kerkvliet,  1991;  Mansson,  2004). 
Integration can have both positive and negative effects on firm productivity and efficiency. 
The downstream integration can have positive effects as inputs will be available at lower 
cost.  At  the  same  time,  there  can  be  substantially  reduction  in  input  quality  as  the  firm 
sacrifices purchasing from a competitive market. Integration may be also beneficial from a 
transaction cost perspective. The possibility of  the hold-up problem will also be reduced 
significantly and the cost of negotiation and bargaining will be very minimal. This study 
finds a positive impact of integration (VERTICAL) on firm productivity.  
The next control variable is EXCISE which is measured as the ratio of excise tax paid 
to value of output. Higher excise tax rate has detrimental effect on production. It will affect 
productivity and efficiency only when it influences the allocation of resources. A negative 
association between EXCISE and productivity is expected as the likelihood of excise tax 
affecting internal resource allocation is very high. In model-2, the sign of variable ‘EXCISE’ 
is negative and statistically significant.  The result suggests that firms subject to higher rates 
of excise duty have a lower level of productivity. The variable DEP-INT i.e., depreciation 
intensity measures the vintage of capital and controls for the technology used in the firms. 
We find that firms with higher depreciation intensity have a lower level of productivity. The 
depreciation rate will be higher in the firms where the plants and machineries are old. Hence, 
the negative sign of DEP-INT variable is as per our expectation. 
We have measured financial pressure of the firm by total borrowings to total assets 
(BORROW).
10  Earlier we have argued as most of the debt is from government ow ned 
financial institutions and public sector banks, the disciplinary effect of the debt may not be 
very high in India. Therefore, the interest payment pressure may not be too restrictive to 
induce  managers  to  perform  more.  However,  the  cumulative  borrowing   from  different 
government owned financial institutions may make the companies unfavourable for further 
lending. This can affect their overall financial position and they may face financial constraint. 
Hence, we expect a negative effect of financial pressu re (BORROW) on firm productivity. 
Nickell and Nicolitsas (1999) have measured the financial pressure by interest payment ratio 
which is defined as interest payments to profit before tax, depreciation and interest payments 
(PBDIT). They find a negative effect of interest payment on employment and pay-rise. But, 
they have found a positive impact of financial pressure on productivity even though the 
magnitude of the effect  is low. When we have used their measure in model-2, the estimate 
turned out to be insig nificant which means the productivity level is neutral to interest 
                                                           
10 To Rajan and Zingales (1995) the most appropriate definition of financial leverage is by the ratio of 
debt (both short term and long term) to total assets. They have argued that the broadest definition of 
stock leverage is the ratio of total liabilities to total assets. 18 
 
payment  ratio.
11  As we have explained above, this shows the non -disciplinary effect of 
interest payment. Koke and Renneboog (2005) have found a positive impact of bank debt on 
productivity growth  for  German  firms.  However,  they  didn’t  find  any  impact  of  interest 
payment ratio or debt-equity ratio on productivity growth. They conclude that the degree of 
leverage is not important for monitoring rather the type of creditors matter. In this study, we 
find the effect of leverage (BORROW) on firm productivity as negative. In the literature it is 
argued that when the productivity level of a firm is consistently low, then the firm’s reliance 
on debt is more as internal accruals are low. Therefore, debt may be negatively related to 
productivity (Kato, 2005). 
IX.  INTERACTION BETWEEN COMPETITION AND OWNERSHIP 
We now look at the effects of corporate governance and competition on total factor 
productivity.  In  model-3  of  Table-3  we  have  included  the  interaction  variable  of  insider 
ownership and CR4 (i.e., CR4*INS). The sign and significance of all other variables remain 
unaltered. However, now the competition variable (CR4)  becomes significant and positive.
12 
This highlights the fact that competition has little d isciplinary power when it is considered 
independent of insider ownership level. The insider ownership (INS) estimate is positive and 
statistically  significant.  The  interaction  term  (CR4*INS)  is  negative  and  statistically 
significant.  The  interaction  effect   of  insider  ownership  and  competition  shows 
complementary nature of both the variables. As a result of the interaction effect in the model, 
the increase in productivity with one percentage increase in insider ownership stake is greater 
the higher the level of competition (i.e., the lower the value of CR4). To measure the effect 








 ;  therefore  when  CR4  is  equal  to  1,  the  changes  in 
productivity  is  negative  (i.e.,  -0.418)  with  respect  to    marginal  increase  in  insider  share. 
When CR4 is equal to 0.5 (i.e., when top four firms have 50 percent of market share); the 
change  in  productivity  to  a  unit  increase  in  insider  ownership  is  0.12.  The  slope  of  the 
response  function  when  CR4  is  equal  to  0.3 is  0.33.  Therefore,  a  percentage  increase  in 
insider share has a lager effect on productivity when competition is at a higher level than 
when it is at a lower level. This further confirms the strong synergy between ownership and 
competition in an emerging economy. Higher amount of promoter shareholding has positive 
impact on productivity when competition in firm’s product market is fierce. From this study, 
it is apparent that competition has significant effect on productivity when it is considered 
along with insider ownership.
13  
   
                                                           
11 This is one of the several investigations which we have carried out throughout this study. The result is 
not reported for the sake of conciseness. 
12 Here caution must be exercised while interpreting competition variable (CR4). Since CR4 has been 
interacted with insider ownership variable, while interpreting the coefficient, the interaction effect must 
be taken into account. 
13 We have conducted the joint significance test for CR4, insider share and the interaction term for which 
the null hypothesis is that all these variables are jointly zero. The null hypothesis has been rejected as the 
value of F-statistics is 14.80 with P-value <0.001.  19 
 
 
Table 4. Effects of Ownership and Competition (i.e., HHI, RENT, MKT-SH) on Productivity 
VARIABLE  DEPENDENT VARIABLE: LN(GVA) 








(With Market Share) 
















OWNERSHIP         








































COMPETITION         




   
RENT      -0.0041 
(-6.50)* 
 
MKT-SH        -0.1787 
(-1.18) 
INTERACTIONS         
HHI*INS    -1.9857 
(-5.81)* 
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Adj. R-square  0.9189  0.9192  0.9234  0.9189 








Year & Ind. Dummy  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Obs.  6634  6634  6634  6634 
Notes: 
  Heteroskedasticity consistent t-statistics are in Parentheses. Standard Errors are calculated using White’s 
Heteroskedasticity consistent variance-covariance matrix. 
  *  indicates  significance  at  5  percent  level,  **  indicates  significance  at  10  percent  level,  §  indicates 
significance at 15 percent level. 
 
In Table-4 we have used different measures of competition. In model-4 we have used 
Herfindahl-Hirschman  index  (HHI)  as  the  measure  of  competition.  In  model-5,  we  have 20 
 
studied the interaction of competition (HHI) and ownership (INS). In model-6, we have used 
‘rent’ as a measure of competition and in model-8 we have applied market share as a proxy 
measure  for  competition.  In  model-4,  the  competition  variable  (HHI)  is  negative  but 
statistically  insignificant.  This  finding  reinforces  our  earlier  hypothesis  that  there  is  a 
significant interaction relationship between competition and insider ownership. Competitive 
pressure has very negligible effect on productivity when it is studied separately. Though the 
point estimate of HHI is -0.468 in model-4, it is not statistically significant (t-value=-1.28). 
In model-5, we have introduced the interaction effect between insider stake and HHI. Now, 
the variable HHI  turns out to be positive and significant. When we partially differentiate the 








When there is only one firm in the market the HHI value is 1 and when the market is equally 
shared by all firms the HHI value turns to be 1/N. When HHI is equal to 1, the rise in insider 
share  has  negative  effect  on  productivity.  The  smaller  the  value  of  HHI,  higher  is  the 
competitiveness of the market. As a result of the interaction effect in the model, the increase 
in productivity with one unit increase in insider ownership is greater the smaller the value of 
HHI (i.e., higher is the competition). If a firm is operating in an industry where the HHI value 
equals the industry average, one unit increase in insider stake will result in 0.11 unit increase 
in productivity. The similarity in result using CR4 and HHI suggests that this finding is not 
biased because of the choice of competitive measure. 
Following  Koke  (2001);  Koke  and  Renneboog  (2005);  Januszewski  (1999)  and 
Grosfeld and Tressel (2001) we have used ‘rent’ which is an ex-post measure of the degree of 
competition. Rent is supposed to capture the above normal profit which will reflect the extent 
of  competition  faced  by  a  firm.  In  model-6,  the  coefficient  of  ‘rent’  is  negative  and 
statistically  significant.  This  finding  provides  evidence  that  monopoly  rent  is  negatively 
related to productivity which is similar to the findings of Grosfeld and Tressel (2001). It is 
argued that rent is not only correlated to market power but also with profitability. However, if 
rent is acting as a proxy for profitability, then it should have a positive sign with productivity. 
To note here, we could not find any interaction effect between insider shareholding and rent. 
In model-7, we have introduced market share (MKT-SH) as a proxy for competition. Though 
the sign of the variable is as per our expectation, it turned out to be statistically insignificant. 
Also we fail to find any interaction effect between market share and insider ownership. 
 
X.  CONCLUDING REMARKS 
This paper analyzes the impact of corporate governance mechanisms (ownership type 
and concentration, group affiliation, capital structure) and product market competition on 
productivity. We have used a panel of more than 1,833 firms over the years 2000-01 to 2003-
04. It is noted that ownership has a positive impact on productivity. This strengthens our 
argument that the higher amount of insider stake in Indian firm enhances firm efficiency and 
productivity which is beneficial for the whole economy. It provides further evidence to the 
fact  that  countries  with  weak  legal  enforcement  can  have  better  firm  performance  with 
moderate concentrated ownership. 
The major finding of this paper relates to the complementary nature of relationship 
between insider ownership and competition. We find that firms with higher amount of insider 
stake are more productive only when competition in firm’s product market is intense. Our 
finding regarding the beneficial effect of competition is in conformity with the theoretical 
predictions and existing empirical evidence. The complementary nature of competition and 21 
 
insider share is being supported by previous empirical evidences. Financial pressure or debt 
intensity is seen to have a negative impact on firm productivity. It provides further evidence 
that large amount of debt may be creating financial constraint because of which we observe a 
negative  relation  of  debt  intensity  with  productivity.  At  the  same  time,  it  highlights  the 
signalling argument of debt because of which we see a positive association between debt 
intensity and firm value.  
Our finding of negative effect of DFI’s holding on firm productivity gives further 
impetus  to  the  argument  that  government  funded/raised  financial  institutions  are  poor 
monitors  of  corporations.  Their  soft  budget  constraint  and  ambiguity  in  objectives  are 
detrimental to the economy as it erodes firm value and results in lower firm productivity. This 
evidence calls for a change in Indian financial system. Also, domestic institutional investors 
do not play a significant role in improving firm productivity. At best, their investment in 
large amounts can boost investor’s confidence in a particular company. But, from a long term 
perspective institutional investors’ shareholding is not helpful in enhancing firm productivity. 
Corporate shareholders and FIIs are strategic investors. They have proven to be advantageous 
from a long term perspective as their shareholdings resulted in higher firm productivity. 
These findings have important policy implications. The positive impact of increased 
product market competition on productivity requires that competition policy should aim at 
fostering competition. India has embarked upon economic reforms since 1991. It has taken 
several pro-competitive measures via a series of changes in both domestic and trade policies 
which  would  affect  firm-performance  positively.  The  complementary  nature  of  insider 
ownership and competition shows that policies relating to ownership dilution must be enacted 
with due cautions. The negative effect of DFI’s ownership on firm productivity calls for a 
reversal in the goals and objectives of the institutions. Finally, the negative effect of debt 
intensity on firm productivity raises question about the long term disciplinary power of the 
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Appendix 1: Variable Description 
 
Variables  Abbreviation  Definition 
Output  Y  Output measured by Gross Value added deflated by Wholesale 
price index. 
Capital  Ln(K)  Log of Capital. Capital is defied as Gross fixed assets deflated 
by Machineries and Machine Tools Price Index. 
Labour  Ln(L)  Log  of  Labour.  Labour  is  measured  by  wages  and  Salaries 
deflated by consumer price index of industrial workers. 
Insider Share  INS  Share of Promoter/Insider. In the estimation, it is used in a 0 to 




IINV  Institutional investor’s i.e., Mutual funds, UTI and Insurance 
companies’ share. Measured in 0-1 scale. 
Development Financial 
Institutions’ Share 
DFIS  Development  Financial  Institutions  i.e.,  Banks  and  financial 
institutions’ Share. Measured in 0-1 scale. 
Corporate Shareholding  CORPORATE  Private corporate bodies’ share. Measured in 0-1 scale. 
Foreign Shareholding  FOREIGN  FII+NRI/OCB’s Share. Measured in 0-1 scale. 
Group Affiliation  GROUP  Dummy  for  Group  Affiliation.  Group=1  if  affiliated  to  a 
business house, 0 otherwise. 
Sales  Ln(S)  Natural Logarithm of Sales 
R&D Expenditure  R&D  Aggregate Research and Development Expenditure scaled by 
Gross fixed assets. 
Selling Expenses  ADV  Advertising Exp. + Marketing Exp. + Distribution Exp. scaled 
by Gross Fixed Assets 
Capital Import Intensity  CAPIMP-INT  Capital goods imports scaled by sales 






Ratio of Gross Value added to value of output 
Excise-tax intensity  EXCISE  Ratio of Excise tax to value of output 
Age  Ln(Age)  Natural Logarithm of Age. 
(Age=2004 – Year of Incorporation) 
Debt Intensity or Leverage  BORROW  Total Borrowings by total assets. Used one year lagged values. 
Short-term borrowing  SHORT  Short term bank loan + Commercial Paper + Debenture to total 
borrowings. Used one year lagged values. 
Bank Borrowing  BANK  Bank Loan to total borrowings. Used one year lagged values. 
Four-firm concentration 
Ratio 
CR4  Four firm concentration Ratio. Calculated for each NIC 2-digit 
sector separately. While calculating we have considered all the 
firms in their respective sector in the database. 
Herfindahl-Hirschman 
index 
HHI  Herfindahl-Hirschman index. Calculated for each NIC 2-digit 
sector separately. While calculating we have considered all the 
firms in their respective sector in the database. 
 
Rent  RENT  Rent is defined as total sales less labour, raw material, power 
and capital cost normalized by gross value added. 
Market Share  MKT-SH  Market share of firm’ in their respective 2-digit industry group. 
Interaction of CR4 and 
Insider Share 
CR4*INS  The interaction of CR4 and Insider share 
Interaction of Herfindahl-
Hirschman index and 
Insider share 
HHI*INS  The interaction of HHI and Insider share 
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